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CONSISTENCY AND OPTIMALITY IN A DYNAMIC GAME 
OF POLLUTION CONTROL II: MONOPOLY 
Amitrajeet A. Batabyal 
ABSTRACT 
This paper continues a line of research begun in Batabyal ("Consistency and Optimality in 
a Dynamic Game of Pollution Control I: Competition," ERI Study Paper #95-29). I model the 
interaction between a regulator and a monopolistic, polluting firm as a Stackelberg differential game 
in which the regulator leads. The firm creates pollution, which results in a stock externality. I 
analyze the intertemporal effects of alternative pollution control measures. The principal issue here 
concerns the dynamic inconsistency of the optimal solution. Inter alia, I compare the steady state 
levels of pollution under optimal and under dynamically consistent policies. 
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CONSISTENCY AND OPTIMALITY IN A DYNAMIC GAME 
OF POLLUTION CONTROL II: MONOPOLY 
I. Introduction 1 
As is well known, 2 the static Pigouvian approach to environmental regulation involves setting 
a corrective tax equal to the marginal social damage caused by the externality. Unfortunately, this 
approach overlooks the fact that most contemporary regulatory problems in environmental economics 
are dynamic in nature. As such, any reasonable analysis of environmental regulation must explicitly 
account for four features which are germane owing to the dynamic nature of the underlying problem. 
The first feature concerns the inherent conflict in the objectives of the regulator and the polluter. The 
second feature pertains to the ongoing nature of the interaction between the regulator and the 
polluter. Third, the question of the dynamic effects of alternate regulatory instruments is relevant. 
Fourth, because the interaction between the regulator and the polluter is ongoing, the parties are 
forward looking, i.e., the future affects the present. As a result, analyses of environmental regulation 
must address the problem of dynamic inconsistency of the adopted regulatory policies. While the 
significance of the first feature is generally well understood, analyses of environmental regulation 
which explicitly incorporate all four features have been few and far between. 3 
Given this state of affairs, in this paper I study environmental regulation in a dynamic context, 
explicitly incorporating all four features mentioned in the above paragraph. An important part of my 
analysis will consist of studying the effects of alternate price control instruments. While there exists 
II thank Larry Karp, Maury Obstfeld, and seminar participants at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst for 
useful comments. The USDA, and the Giannini Foundation provided fmancial support. The usual disclaimer applies. 
2See Bator (1958), Baumol and Oates (1988), and Cropper and Oates (1992) among others. 
3For more on this aspect, see the discussion in Batabyal (1995a). 
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a large literature on the effects of price versus quantity control instruments,4 a literature of similar 
magnitude on the properties of alternate price control measures does not exist. As such, in focusing 
on the properties of alternate price control instruments, I hope to contribute to this nascent literature 
on "prices versus prices." 
I shall model the interaction between a regulator and a monopolistic polluter as a deterministic 
Stackelberg differential game in which the regulator leads. 5 The differential game incorporates two 
significant aspects of the regulator/polluter interaction; first, it explicitly considers the dynamic nature 
of the interaction, and, second, it recognizes that the game being played by the regulator and the 
polluting firm at each instant in time is different owing to the evolution of the state. 
The first part of the analysis considers dynamically inconsistent policies in a game in which 
the state, i. e., the stock of pollution, evolves in a manner known to both the players. In every case 
analyzed, the production of a certain good causes pollution. The informational costs of taxing 
pollution directly are assumed to be prohibitive. As a result, the regulator taxes the production of 
the polluting good. The regulator's objective is to maximize the sum of net benefit and tax revenues. 6 
The two kinds of policies available to the regulator include a unit tax and an ad valorem tax. 
Depending on, the industry structure, as compared to a unit tax, an ad valorem tax often leads to 
different (a) levels of revenue and (b) welfare effects. For these reasons, I have chosen to study the 
dynamic effects of these two policy instruments. Inter alia, my study will involve a comparison of 
the outcomes of the different games resulting from the use of these two price control instruments. 
4See Weitzman (1974). See Batabyal (1995b) for a recent survey of many of the important issues. 
5 A companion paper-Batabyal (1995a)-analyzes the competitive industry case. 
6See van der Ploeg and de Zeeuw (1992, p. 121) for a similar objective. 
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As I shall show, an important part of this comparative exercise will turn on the intertemporal 
consistency of the policies employed by the regulator. Further, the effectiveness of regulatory action 
will depend fundamentally on whether the firm's production costs are related to the stock of pollution. 
Finally, if the regulator's policy instrument set is sufficiently large, distortions stemming from market 
imperfections can be dealt with effectively. 
Section 2 describes the Stackelberg differential game. Section 3 derives and compares the 
various open loop policies. In section 4, I derive time-consistent policies and then compare them to 
the time-inconsistent policies of section 3. Section 5 offers concluding comments and discusses 
directions for future research. 
2. The Stackelberg Differential Game 
My model is a variant of one analyzed by Karp (1984). A monopolistic, polluter maximizes 
profits. P(q) is the thrice differentiable inverse demand function faced by the firm. Let P I(q)< 0, 
where q is the production rate of the firm. Associated with production at rate q are two kinds of 
costs. The first kind of cost depends on the current stock of pollution. 7 Only a portion of this cost 
is internalized b,y the firm. Let c(x) be the internalized average cost of producing unit output at time 
t when the stock of pollution is x(t). Then c(x)q represents the instantaneous, internalized pollution-
dependent cost of producing at rate q. I assume that c I(X»O, c II(X» 0, and that c(O) = 0. 
The second kind of cost is independent of the level of pollution. Let w denote the constant 
marginal cost of producing at rate q; then wq represents the pollution independent cost of producing 
at rate q. Let 'tu and 'a denote the unit and the ad valorem tax, respectively. Then the firm's payoff 
7See Batabyal (l995a) for an example of such stock dependent costs. 
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in an infinite horizon game in which the regulator uses a unit tax and where r denotes the interest rate 
IS 
JF = Ie -rt{p(q)q-wq-'tuq- c(x)q}dt. 
o 
When the regulator employs an ad valorem tax, the corresponding payoff for the firm is 
where 't
a 
= 1/(1 +(). 
JF = Ie -rt{'taP(q)q-wq- c(x)q}dt, 
o 
(1) 
(2) 
There are three components to the regulator's payoff. A twice differentiable function, B(q) , 
measures social benefit when production is at rate q. D(x) is a twice differentiable function which 
measures the damage from pollution. Alternately put, the firm creates pollution; the level of this 
pollution at time t is x(t). The function D(·) maps pollution to a measure of environmental damage 
for society.8 Let B l(q»O, B II(q)<O, B l(q»O, B II(q)<O, D I(X»O, and let D II(X» 0. When the 
regulator uses a unit tax to control pollution, his payoff is 
JR = Ie -rt{B(q)+'tuq- D(x)}dt. 
o 
When he uses an ad valorem tax, his corresponding payoff is 
JR = Ie -rt{B(q)+(l-'t)P(q)q- D(x)}dt. 
o 
8 Also see Batabyal (l995a). 
(3) 
(4) 
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The regulator controls "Cu(t) and "Ca(t) and the finn controls q(t). As the leader, the regulator 
announces a trajectory for the tax which the firm treats parametrically. The regulator and the firm 
are constrained by the evolution of the stock of pollution which is given by 
dx/dt = i = q(t), (5) 
where x( 0) = xo>O is given. Equation (5) tells us that the evolution of the stock of pollution is a 
function of the flow of production. In my model there is no way to "naturally" reduce pollution. 9 
Depending on the policy employed by the regulator, different steady state levels of output and 
pollution emerge. One can think of these levels as the outcomes of different games. I shall say that 
game 1 results in less pollution than game 2 iff x{< x;, where xt, i = 1,2 refers to the steady state 
pollution level in game i, i = 1,2. Similarly, I shall say that game 1 results in less output than game 
2 iff q{< q;, where qt, i = 1,2 refers to the steady state output level in game i, i = 1,2. In many 
cases, it will not be possible to obtain general results. In such cases, my analysis will concentrate on 
special functional forms. 
3. Open Loop Taxes 
In this, section I shall derive the optimal open loop unit and ad valorem taxes for the 
regulatory objectives described in section 2. These taxes are dynamically inconsistent except when 
the stock-dependent cost function is constant. In other words, if the stock-dependent cost function 
is not constant and the regulator is able to alter-at some time t > O-the trajectory of taxes he set 
9See Batabyal (l995a) for a discussion of the implications of using a state equation i=q(t)-f(x), wheref(x) is 
the regenerative capacity of the environment. 
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at t = 0, he will choose to do so. This is an extremely important fact, and I shall have more to say 
about dynamic inconsistency in section 4. 
3.1 The Open Loop Unit Tax 
I shall solve the regulator's problem using a method due to Chen and Cruz (1972) and Simaan 
and Cruz (1973a, 1973b). This method clearly brings out the connection between dynamic 
inconsistency and the pollution-dependent cost function. The basic idea is as follows. The regulator 
treats the firm's first-order condition as an ordinary constraint and the firm's costate variable as a state 
variable. These two conditions, along with the requirement that the optimal solution approach a 
steady state, converts the differential game into a control problem for the regulator. 
When the regulator levies a unit tax on the firm, the firm's first-order necessary conditions are 
P l(q)q+P(q)-w-tu -C(X)+A(t) = 0, (6) 
and 
~ = rA+ cl(x)q, (7) 
where A(t) is the costate variable associated with (5). The reader should note that (7) represents a 
jump state constraint. 10 That is, A(O) is free and the value of A(t) is determined by current and/or 
J 
future events. In other words, (7) is not a fixed initial state constraint for the regulator. This makes 
the regulator's problem a nonstandard control problem. Solving for tu from (6) and substituting in 
(3) I get 
JR = fe -rt{B(q)+P'(q)q2+P(q)q-wq-c(x)q+Aq- D(x)}dt. (8) 
o 
lOpor more on jump state constraints, see Karp and Newbery (1993). 
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Equation (8) gives the regulator's payoff Of particular interest is the term 'Aq. Since A is the shadow 
value of pollution to the firm, Aq can be thought of as the firm's implicit value of polluted air gained 
by production at rate q. I have now converted the regulator's problem from one of maximizing (3) 
over 'tu subject to (5) to one of maximizing (8) over q subject to (5) and (7) . The first-order 
necessary conditions to the regulator's problem are 
B '(q)+P "(q)q2+ 3P '(q)q+P(q)-w-c(x)+'A +01 + 02C '(x) 0, 
01 = r0 1 +c '(x)q+D '(x)- 02C "(x)q, 
and 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
where 01 and02 are the costate variables associated with (5) and (7) . The key equation here is (11) . 
Since A(O) is free, as Simaan and Cruz (1973b) have noted, the boundary condition for 02 IS 
0/0)=0. Using this last condition, (11) can be written as 
(12) 
Equation (12) tells us that the regulator's marginal value of the firm's shadow value of pollution can 
be expressed as the difference between the initial stock of pollution and the current stock of pollution. 
Using q( t) 2 0;, equation (12) implies that 02 (t) < O. This means that VtE (0,00), the regulator will 
want to decrease the firm's marginal value of pollution. Hence, this solution is dynamically 
inconsistent. Since the firm does not completely internalize the impact of the pollution it causes, the 
regulator will want to deviate from the policy trajectory he announced at t = 0 and decrease the firm's 
marginal value of pollution to the socially optimal level. The reader will note that the constancy of 
the pollution dependent cost function is necessary and sufficient to eliminate the inconsistency of the 
above solution. 
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A comment on (7) is in order. I have already noted that optimality requires that the regulator 
set aiO)=O. Once he has done so, (7) is a binding constraint on the regulator's subsequent actions. 
In other words, (7) acts as a rational expectations constraint for the regulator. The rational 
expectations nature of this constraint stems from the fact that the firm's problem is dynamic. 
3.2 The Open Loop Ad Valorem Tax 
I shall now derive the solution when the regulator uses an ad valorem tax. The first-order 
necessary conditions to the firm's problem are 
'C a {P(q) +P I(q)q} -w-c(x) + A(t) = 0, (13) 
and (7). Solving for 'C
a 
from (13) and substituting into (4), I get 
JR = Ie -rt[B(q)+P(q)q-tJ1(q){W+C(X)-A}- D(x)]dt, (14) 
o 
where tJ1(q)=<!>(q)q, <!>(q)=l/{a(q)+l}, la(q)l<l, and a(q) is the price flexibility, i.e., the reciprocal 
of the demand elasticity. The first-order necessary conditions to the regulator's problem are 
(15) 
(16) 
and 
°2 = -tJ1(q)., (17) 
where a1 and a2 are the costate variables associated with (5) and (7). 
Equations (8) and (14) tell us that, unlike the competitive case studied in Batabyal (1995a), 
the use of these two policy instruments leads to different outcomes. This is because these two taxes 
affect the shape of the inverse demand function differently. 
9 
3.3 Analysis 
I shall denote steady state values by "*" . When the regulator uses a unit tax, I get q* = 0 from 
(5), A * = 0 from (7), o~ = -D I(X *)/r from (10), and 0; =xo -x * from (12). Substituting these values 
in (9), I get an equation for the steady state level of pollution, x*. This equation is 
B I(O)+p(O)-w-c(x *)-{D I(X *)/r} +c I(X *)(xo - X *) = O. (18) 
Comparing (18) with the corresponding equation for a competitive industry in Batabyal 
(1995a), I note that the steady state level of pollution is the same irrespective of whether the industry 
is competitive or monopolistic. When the regulator uses an ad valorem tax, the expressions for q* 
and A* remain the same as above. However, now o~=[{ -tV(O)c/(x *)-DI(x *)}/r], and 0; can be 
obtained by integrating (17) and then evaluating the resulting expression at t = 00, using oiO)=O. 
Substituting these values for q, A, 01' and O2 into (15) gives me an equation for x *. This is 
B 1(0) +p(O)_tV/(O){ w+c(x *)} -tV(O)c I(X *)/r- {D I(X *)/r} + c I(X *)0; = O. (19) 
Inspecting (18) and (19) I find that in both cases, the steady state pollution effects of the two taxes, 
are fundamentally affected by the initial level of pollution as long as the stock dependent cost function 
is nonconstant. 11 In other words, history matters. 
From (6) and (13), I can compute expressions for the open loop unit and ad valorem taxes 
at t = 0 and at t = 00 . With these expressions, I can now state 
Proposition 1: The optimal ad valorem tax is nonzero at t = 0 and at t = 00, assuming that 
{p(e)+p I(e)q} #=0, at t = 0 and at t = 00. The same is true of the optimal unit tax as long as 
{P(q)+P I(q)q} #= {w+c(x)- A}. 
IIFor the ad valorem tax case, the dependence of X * on x(O) can be verified in certain special cases. One such 
case is when the inverse demand ftmction is isoelastic. 
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Proof· Recall that -C a ( 0) = [ {w + c (xo) - A ( 0) } ] / [P { q ( O)} + P I { q ( 0) } q ( 0)] * 0, and that 
-c; = [{w +c(x *)}/{P(O)}] * o. Further, observe that {P(q) + pl(q)q} * {w + c(x) - A} ~ -c/O) = 
[P{ q(O)} +P I{ q(O) }q(O)-w-C(Xo)+A] *0 and that -c: =[P(O)-w-c(x *)]*0 . • 
Proposition 1 describes the conditions, with perfect regulatory commitment, under which an 
optimal program does not involve setting zero taxes either at the beginning or at the end of the game. 
Note that because these solutions are inconsistent, as time progresses, the regulator will want to 
decrease the firm's valuation of pollution. Finally, observe that if the conditions stated in the 
proposition are not satisfied, it is possible for these optimal open loop taxes to be temporarily zero. 
I can now compare the steady state pollution and output levels that arise from the use of the 
two open loop taxes. Since a general analysis of this question cannot be conducted, the subsequent 
analysis will concentrate on special cases. Recall that in every case q* = O. Hence, the variable of 
interest is x*. I shall use (18) and (19). Let B(q)=yq-(l/2)q2, D(x)=(l/2)OX2, c(x)=a1x, 
P(q)=q - cx, aE(O,I), and let (l-a)y> w. Substituting these functions into (18) and (19), I find that, 
as compared to the ad valorem tax, the unit tax leads to a higher (lower) level of pollution as 
ay/{2a1 +(I-a)o/r} >«) [[{y-w+ a1xO}/ {2a1 +(I-a)o/r}]-[{y-w+a1xo}/{2a1 + o/r}]]. Next, 
consider the case in which the damage function is linear, i.e.,D(x)=ox. The functional forms for 
benefit, inverse demand, and the stock-dependent cost are as above. Substituting these equations into 
(18) and (19), I note that, as compared to the ad valorem tax, the unit tax leads to lower (higher) 
pollution as a { (o/r) - y} >( <) o. While it is difficult to interpret these parametric restrictions along 
economic lines, the reader will note that the key parameter is the price flexibility, -a. 
I now use (18) to compare the steady state levels of pollution that arise under alternate 
specifications for the benefit and inverse demand functions when the regulator uses a unit tax. Let 
11 
P(q)=a-bq, D(x)=ox, and let c(x)=cx1x. Then, irrespective of whether B(q)=yq-(1I2)q2 or 
B(q)=yq, the unit tax leads to the same level of pollution. Next, let B(q)=yq-(1I2)q2, 
D(x)=(1I2)ox2, c(x)=cx1x. Ify >w, the unit tax leads to a lower level of pollution when P(q)=a-bq, 
as opposed to when P(q)=q -rx, cxE(O,I) . 
Note that the results of the above analysis depend in a fundamental way on the properties of 
the pollution-dependent cost function. If this function is constant, then the open loop and the 
consistent solutions of section 4 coincide. As such, the regulator's policy-set at the beginning of 
the game-is credible and the question of forward-looking firms thwarting the intended objective of 
a particular plan of action does not arise. 
Given that the unit tax and the ad valorem tax lead to different outcomes, I now ask at what 
level each tax should be set when the regulator wishes to use both taxes simultaneously. The answer 
is contained in 
Proposition 2: When the regulator uses both taxes simultaneously, it is optimal for him to set 'a = 00 
and L u = - {w + c(x) - A} . 
Proof" When the regulator uses both taxes simultaneously, the firm's objective functional is 
JF = Ie -rt{Lf(q)q-wq-Luq- c(x)q}dt. 
o 
(20) 
The first-order necessary conditions include Lu=La{P'(q)q+P(q)} -w-C(X)+A. Substituting this into 
the regulator's objective functional, I get 
JR = Ie -rt[B(q)+P(q)q+Lf '(q)q2_wq-c(x)q-D(x)+ 'A(t)q]dt. (21) 
o 
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Now let 'ta~ o. Since the regulator's current value Hamiltonian is linear and decreasing in 'ta, it is 
optimal to set 'ta=O. This in turn implies that (a=oo, and that 'tu=-{w+C(X)-Iv} . • 
Proposition 2 tells us that when the regulator chooses to use both taxes simultaneously, it is 
optimal for him to levy an infinite ad valorem tax and impose a unit subsidy equal to -{w+c(x)- Iv}, 
where Iv solves (7) with A * = o. Using 't a =0 in (21) and comparing the resulting equation with the 
corresponding equation in Batabyal (1995a), I find that when the regulator uses unit and ad valorem 
taxes simultaneously, he is able to force the monopolistic firm to behave competitively. This is 
because the simultaneous use of unit and ad valorem taxes allows the regulator to shift and rotate the 
inverse demand function. As a result, he is able to confront the monopolistic firm with an infinitely 
elastic nonstationary function. Note that unlike the competitive industry case studied in Batabyal 
(1995a), the simultaneous use of two taxes does not make one tax redundant. 
4. Dynamically Consistent Taxes 
The problem with inconsistent policies, i.e., open loop policies, is that such policies are not 
credible. The forward-looking finn will recognize that at t = 0, the regulator will set a tax trajectory 
from which he will later want to deviate. Thus, such a tax trajectory will not be believed by the firm 
and hence the original policy will fail to achieve its objectives. This lack of credibility of open loop 
policies provides a rationale for the study of dynamically consistent policies. 
I shall obtain consistent controls by using a method employed in Buiter (1983) and in Karp 
(1984). While other methods-see Karp (1991)-for obtaining consistent controls exist, there are 
two advantages to using the BuiterlKarp method. First, this method makes the logic of the solution 
transparent. Second, the method facilitates the comparison of results obtained in section 3 with the 
13 
results to be derived in this section. The basic idea is as follows. In a Stackelberg game, it must be 
possible to use the follower's first-order condition to eliminate the leader's control from his objective 
functional. When this has been done and the leader's problem has the form 
JR = maxq(t)j[e -rt{g(q,x)} +hq(t)A(t)]dt, hE ffi., 
o 
x = q(t), x(O) = xo> 0, 
~ = rA +c I(X)q(t), A(t)~O, 
(22) 
(23) 
(24) 
where g( q, x), in my case, is a linear combination of the derivatives of the benefit, damage, inverse 
demand, and the stock-dependent cost functions, one can obtain consistent controls by using 
Theorem 1: When the leader's problem has the form (22)-(24), consistent controls can be found by 
solving 
JR = maxq(t)j e -rtg(q, x)dt, 
o 
(25) 
subject to (23). Theorem 1 can be proved as in Karp (1984, pp. 94-96). Note that while the proof 
requires that the function multiplying the follower's costate variable be linear in the leader's control, 
the proof does/not depend on h or the follower's costate variable being nonnegative. 
Put differently, in the class of problems that can be stated as (22)-(24), the leader obtains 
consistent controls by disregarding the effect that the follower's marginal value of the state has on his 
own payoff The logical basis of this method is as follows. One way to eliminate the inconsistency 
of the open loop solutions of section 3 lies in removing the term which makes the solution dependent 
on xo' This can be done in two ways. The first approach is to posit that the stock-dependent cost 
function is constant. Then C I(X)::: 0 and the inconsistency disappears. However, this is a strong and, 
14 
a priori, unrealistic restriction. The second approach lies in making (xo - x) vanish. This is exactly 
what the above-described method for obtaining consistent controls does " .. . by treating the 
[regulator's] problem as [a] sequence of short open loop problems, which in the limit becomes an 
infinite sequence of static optimization problems" (Karp 1982, p. 117). Intuitively, one can think of 
a regulator who revises his tax policy whenever air quality declines by some set amount. The idea 
is to let this set amount and hence the time interval between successive revisions approach zero. 
When the regulator does not set a specific tax trajectory at the beginning of the game but 
continuously revises his control, Xo in (xo - x) must be replaced by x(t). When this is done, (xo - x) 
vanishes and the resulting solution is dynamically consistent. The only disadvantage of the above 
method lies in the requirement that the function multiplying A(t) be linear in the leader's control. This 
means that this approach cannot be used to find consistent controls for the general case in which the 
regulator uses an ad valorem tax. However, even in this case, for specific functional forms, the 
method can be used. 
Consistent controls always result in a lower payoff to the regulator than do open loop controls 
except when the two kinds of controls coincide. This stems from the fact that forcing the controls 
to satisfy the principle of optimality completely eliminates any gain accruing to the regulator from 
setting policy at the beginning of the game. Alternately, when the regulator uses consistent controls, 
his " ... period of commitment [shrinks] to zero." (Buiter 1989, p. 244). In a manner analogous to 
Karp (1984, p. 88), the claim in this paragraph can be verified formally by observing that 
maxq(t)[j{e -rtg(q,x) + Aq}dt] 
o 
2 {maxq(t)[je -rtg(q,x)dt]} + jqXdt, 
o 0 
(26) 
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where t} and >:. are the optimized values of the output rate and the follower's marginal value of the 
state which arise from the solution to the maximization problem on the RHS of (26) . The constraints 
for both problems are the same and are given by (23) and (24). Equality in (26) holds iff >:'=0, a 
condition which holds when the pollution-dependent cost function is constant. When this last 
condition holds, the open loop and the consistent controls coincide. 
I now obtain dynamically consistent controls, in turn, when the regulator uses a unit tax and 
then when the regulator uses an ad valorem tax. 
4.1 The Dynamically Consistent Unit Tax 
When the regulator uses a unit tax, the first-order conditions to his problem are 
BI(q)+q2PII(q)+3qpl(q)+p(q)-w-c(x)+ 0 = 0, (27) 
and 
iJ = -ro +c l(x)q+D I(X), (28) 
where a is the costate variable associated with (5) . The steady state level of pollution, x*, solves 
B I(O)+p(O)-w-c(x *)- D I(X *)/r = 0. (29) 
4.2 The Dynamically Consistent Ad Valorem Tax 
When the regulator uses an ad valorem tax, the method proposed in Theorem 1 cannot be 
used to solve for the consistent tax in the general case owing to the nonlinearity of W(q). However, 
for some functional forms, W(q) is linear. In what follows, I shall analyze the impact of an ad 
valorem tax when P(q)=q - ex, aE(O,I). In this case, W(q)=q/(I-a) and Theorem 1 can be used to 
conduct the analysis. When the regulator uses an ad valorem tax to control pollution, the first-order 
conditions to his problem are 
B '(q)+(l-a)q -CX-{w/(l-a)} -{ c(x)/(I-a)} +0 = 0, 
and 
a = ro+c '(x)ql(I-a)+D '(x), 
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(30) 
(31) 
where 0 is the costate variable associated with (5) . I close this subsection by deriving an equation 
satisfied by x*. Using (30), this equation is 
B'(O)-{w/(I- a)}-{c(x *)/(I-a)}-D'(x *)lr = 0. (32) 
4.3 Analysis 
I now compare the steady state pollution and output effects of the two policy instruments. 
Recall that q* = ° in every case analyzed in this paper. I first compare the open loop policies with 
the dynamically consistent policies. 
The results of this paragraph are summarized in Table 1. The two equations which I shall use 
to compare the pollution levels with the open loop unit tax and with the dynamically consistent unit 
tax are (18) and (29). The subsequent analysis concentrates on special functional forms. If the 
relevant functions in (18) and (29) are arbitrary but c '(x) =0, then a comparison of (18) and (29) tells 
us that the open loop unit tax and the consistent unit tax both give rise to the same level of pollution. 
Using B(q)=yq-(1I2)q2, D(x)=(1I2)ox2, P(q)=a-bq, c(x)=a1x in (18) and (29) and assuming that 
y > w, I find that the open loop unit tax leads to a lower (higher) level of pollution as compared to 
the consistent unit tax as a1x/{2a1 +olr} «» [[ {y +a-w }/{ a 1 +(olr)}] -[ {y +a-w }I{2a1 + (o/r) }]]. 
Now consider B(q)=yq-(I/2)q2, D(x)=ox, P(q)=a-bq, c(x)=a1x. If(y+a»{w+ (olr)}, then as 
compared to the consistent unit tax, the open loop unit tax leads to a lower (higher) level of pollution 
I 
Table 1 
Steady State Pollution Effects of the Open Loop Unit Tax versus the 
Dynamically Consistent Unit Tax 
Functional Forms III Restrictions on Parameters III 0Een LooE Unit Tax 
B(q) = yq- (l/2)q2, Y > wand Lower Pollution 
D(x) = (1/2)ox 2 a lx/{2a l + air} < 
P(q) = a-bq, c(x) = alx [[{y+a-w}/{al+(alr)}] -
c(x) = alx [{ y +a-w }I{2al + (air) }]] 
B(q) = yq- (l/2)q2 y+a> {w+ (air)} and Lower Pollution 
D(x) = ax a lx/2a l > < 
P(q) = a-bq, c(x) = alx [[ {y +a-w- (air) }lal] -
c(x) = alx [{ y +a-w- (air) }/2al ]] 
B(q) = yq- (1/2)q2 Y > {w+(alr)} and Lower pollution 
D(x) = ax a lx/2a l > < 
P(q) = q -<X, aE(O, 1) [[ {y -w- (air) }/al ] -
c(x) = alx [{ y -w- (air) }/2a l ]] 
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Finally, consider 
B(q)=yq-(l/2)q2, D(x)=ax, P(q)=q -<X, aE(O,l), c(x)=alx, and let y>{w+ (air)} . Then as 
opposed to the consistent unit tax, the open loop unit tax leads to a lower (higher) level of pollution 
as alx/2al «» [[{y-w-(alr)}lal]-[y-w- (alr)}/2a l ]]. Inspection of(18) and (29) tells us that 
the effects of these two taxes essentially depend on the properties of the pollution-dependent cost 
function. The other functions affect both the equations in a similar manner. 
N ow consider the steady state pollution effects of the open loop and the dynamically 
consistent ad valorem taxes, with P(q)=q -<X, aE(O,l) . The relevant equations are (19) and (32). 
Table 2 summarizes the results contained in this paragraph. Let B(q)=yq-(l/2)q2, 
D(x)=(1/2)ax2, c(x)=alx and let (l-a)y> w. Then the open loop ad valorem tax gives rise to a 
I 
Table 2 
Steady State Pollution Effects of the Open Loop Ad Valorem Tax versus the 
Dynamically Consistent Ad Valorem Tax 
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Functional Forms III Restrictions on Parameters III 0Een LooE Ad Valorem Tax I 
B(q) = yq- (1/2)q2 (1- a)y > wand Lower Pollution 
D(x) = (l/2)ox 2 [a}x/{2a}+(1- a)olr}] < 
P(q) = q -a, aE(O, 1) [[{(I-a)y- w}1 
c(x) = a}x {a}+(1- a)olr}] -
[{(I-a)y- w}1 
{2a}+(1- a)olr}]] 
B(q) = yq- (l/2)q2 (1-a){y- (olr)} > w Lower Pollution 
D(x) = (l/2)ox and a}x/2a} < 
P(q) = q -a, aE(O, 1) [[{(I-a)y-w-(1- a)olr}1 
c(x) = a}x a}] -
[{(1-a)y-w-(I- a)olr}1 
2a}]] 
lower (higher) level of pollution than does the consistent ad valorem tax as a}x/{2a} +(I-a)olr} 
«» [[{(I-a)y-w}/{a} +(1-a)olr}]-[{(I-a)y-w}/{2a} +(1-a)olr}]]. Next, consider the case 
where B(q)=yq-(l/2)q2, D(x)=ox, c(x)=a}x and where (I-a){y-(olr)}>w. Now as compared to 
the consistent ad valorem tax, the open loop ad valorem tax leads to a lower (higher) level of 
pollution as a~/2a} «» [[{(I-a)y-w-(I-a)olr}/a}]-[{(1-a)y-w-(I- a)olr}/2a}]]. 
I note that these results depend crucially on the properties of the stock-dependent cost 
function. Depending on the magnitudes of the various parameters, there are a number of situations 
in which the use of consistent taxes leads to a higher level of pollution. However, it is important to 
recognize that the use of consistent taxes does not always lead to a higher level of pollution. 12 Note 
12By specifying parameter values, this claim can be easily verified. See Batabyal (l995a) for the details of such 
an exerCIse. 
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that because q *=0 in every case and because D '(x»O, in my model, higher steady state pollution 
implies lower social welfare-as embodied in the regulator's objective functional-in the steady 
state. 13 This means that although consistent taxes can lead to higher steady state levels of pollution, 
the use of such taxes is more plausible because open loop tax policies are not credible. 
I now compare the steady state pollution and output levels that result from the use of 
dynamically consistent taxes. Table 3 summarizes the results. In the rest of this paragraph, I shall 
use P(q)=q -fJ., aE(O,l). Substitute B(q)=yq-(l/2)q2, D(x)=ox, c(x)=alx in (29) and (32) and 
suppose that (l-a){ y -(olr)}> w. I find that the level of pollution with a consistent unit tax is more 
(less) than the level of pollution with a consistent ad valorem tax as [a{(olr)- y}/a l ] «» 0. Next 
substitute B(q)=yq-(l/2)q2, D(x)=(l/2)oX2, c(x)=alx in (29) and (32), and suppose that 
(l-a)y> w. Then the level of pollution with a consistent unit tax is less (more) than the level of 
I 
Table 3 
Steady State Pollution Effects of the Consistent Unit Tax versus the 
Consistent Ad Valorem Tax 
Functional Forms III Restrictions on Parameters III Unit Tax 
B(q) = yq- (1/2)q2 (l-a){ y - (olr)} > wand Higher Pollution 
D(x) = ox [a{ (olr) - y}la l ] < ° 
P(q) = q -fJ., aE(O, 1) 
c(x) = alx 
B(q) = yq- (l/2)q2 (1- a)y > wand Lower Pollution 
D(x) = (1/2)ox 2 ay/{ a l +(1- a)olr} < 
P(q) = q -fJ., aE(O, 1) [[(y-w)/{a l +(l- a)olr}] -
c(x) = alx [(y-w)/{a l + (olr)}]] 
13This result does not hold in models with state equations, more complicated than (5). 
I 
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pollution with a consistent ad valorem tax as ay/{ CX I +(1-a)o/r} «» [[(y -w)/{ a l +(I-cx)o/r}]-
[(y -w)/ {a l +o/r}]]. 
My next task is to rank the steady state pollution levels with the four taxes. Table 4 
summarizes the results of this paragraph. In the rest of this paragraph, a > b means that a leads to a 
greater level of pollution than b, and a~b means that a and b both give rise to the same level of 
pollution. Denote the open loop unit tax, the open loop ad valorem tax, the dynamically consistent 
. d h d . 11 . d l b OL OL DC d DC . 1 I umt tax an t e ynaffilca y consIstent a va orem tax y 'tu , 'ta , 'tu ,an 'ta ,respectIve y. 
shall use equations (18), (19), (29), and (32) for comparative purposes. When 
2 ~ - OL OL DC DC B(q)=yq-(l/2)q , D(x)=ux, c(x)=alx, P(q)=q tX, cxE(O,I), I conclude that 'tu >'ta >'tu >'ta as 
long as [(I-cx){ y -(o/r)} ]=8>w, and [cxlxo +cx{ (o/r)-y} ]=Ll>{ y -(o/r)-w}. This ranking also holds, 
with the same restrictions on the parameters, when B(q)=yq, and the other functions are as above. 
This analysis once again brings out the sensitivity of the qualitative results to the choice of functional 
forms and in particular to the properties of the stock-dependent cost function. 
Table 4 
Steady State Pollution Rankings of the Alternate Policy Instruments 
Industry Structure Functional Forms Restrictions on Ranking of 
Parameters Instruments 
Monopoly B(q) = yq- (l/2)q2 8 > wand 't0L > 't0L > uDC a DC D(x) = Ox Ll > {y-(o/r)- W} 'tu > 'ta (q) = q -tX, CXE(O, 1 
c(x) = cxlx 
Monopoly B(q) = yq, 8>wand 't0L > 't0L > 
D(x) = Ox Ll > {y-(o/r)- w} uDC a DC 'tu > 'ta (q) = q - tX, aE(O, 1 
c(x) = CXlx 
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I close this section by asking at what level the two taxes should be set when the regulator 
chooses to use both dynamically consistent taxes simultaneously. The answer is contained in 
Proposition 3: When the regulator uses both taxes simultaneously, it is optimal for him to set 
DC DC 
'C
u 
=-{w+C(X)-A}, and C
a 
=00. 
Proof· (Outline): The procedure for demonstrating this result is very similar to that employed in the 
proof of Proposition 2. Hence, I omit a formal proof • 
The reader will note that while continuous revision of the tax by the regulator alters the 
solution to his optimization problem, it does not alter his optimal course of action when he chooses 
to use both taxes simultaneously. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper I analyzed the interaction between a monopolistic, polluting firm and a regulator 
as a Stackelberg differential game in which the regulator leads. I studied the effects of open loop and 
consistent unit and ad valorem taxes. I demonstrated the dynamic inconsistency of open loop 
policies, and I discussed the equivalence of the open loop and the consistent policies when production 
costs are unrelated to the stock of pollution. The nonequivalence of the unit tax and the ad valorem 
tax was demonstrated. 
By way of numerous steady state examples, I showed how to interpret the general results, and 
then I ranked the four taxes in terms of their ability to control pollution. These examples demonstrate 
the sensitivity of the qualitative results to ( a) the choice of functional forms for inverse demand and 
stock dependent cost, and (b) the nature of the taxes. 
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Five policy conclusions flow from the analysis in this paper. First, owing to the sensitivity of 
the results to the choice of functional forms, in any given regulatory scenario, empirical research will 
be needed to estimate the parameters of the relevant functions and hence serve as a guide to 
regulatory action. Second, as I have shown here and in Batabyal (1995a), while a unit tax and an ad 
valorem tax are equivalent in a competitive industry, this equivalence breaks down in a monopolistic 
industry. Third, if the regulator's control set is sufficiently large, then he can force the monopolistic 
firm to behave competitively. Fourth, as far as policy credibility is concerned, the efficacy of 
regulatory action depends on the properties of the stock dependent cost function. If production costs 
are unrelated to the stock of pollution, then it makes no difference whether the regulator announces 
a policy trajectory at the beginning of the game or whether he continuously revises his policy. Finally, 
there is a basic tradeoff between policy payoff and policy credibility. Open loop policies yield a 
higher payoff to the regulator than do consistent policies. This is a possible explanation as to why 
many regulators are loath to use dynamically consistent policies. 
Despite Samuel Johnson's pronouncement that "He is no wise man that will quit a certainty 
for an uncertainty," I believe that the most promising extension of this research lies in analyzing the 
issues that I haye addressed in a stochastic framework. Such an analysis will substantially increase 
the model's realism and hence its policy conclusions. 
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